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Globalization has challenged us to find new political definitions that can help us
cope with the complexities and paradoxes of this new era. In the following paper, I
wish to address some of these issues by focusing on the interrelationship between
religion and politics and the renewed interest in defining political authority. I would
like to show that our historical concepts of authority and their relationship to religion
and politics were not simple processes of secularization. The loss of one world
–the fully religious one– does not lead directly to the creation of another. There is,
in between, a difficult task of historical understanding, of coping with the moral and
political dilemmas, of rethinking the past, and of envisioning the need for new
conceptual tools.
If we need to thematize secularization and the relationship between religion
and politics, we must be aware of what Hans Blumenberg said, when referring to
“the characterization of a relation [between religion and politics] as the historical
dependence of an «alienated» formation on an «original» one is not enough to
make it a case for the meaningful application of the term «secularization»”
(Blumenberg, 1991, p. 10). Thus, in order to question our traditional views of
secularization, I wish to focus on the secularization of politics, in terms of political
authority, conceived of as processes of translation, of innovation, and of invention.
The term “secularization” here should not be taken only as describing specific
losses, but, rather, as a metaphor that best captures the very complex processes
by which we humans cope with our “wordly” fear.
Again, as Blumenberg claims, “the patterns and schemas of the salvation story
were to prove to be ciphers and projections of intrawordly problems, like a foreign
language in which is expressed the absolutism of the world of man, of society, so
that all unworldliness would be a metaphor that had to be retranslated into literal
speech. The problem in such a case, quite logically, is not secularization but the
detour that made it necessary in the first place” (Blumenberg, 1991, p. 6).
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Second, with the introduction of the concept of “the vertigo of secularization”, I
wish to describe the fearful reactions that we as humans –and cultures– undergo
when confronted by “the loss of a certainty of a world to come”, to use Hannah
Arendt’s phrase, while facing our need to articulate a political conception of
authority. Our reactions stemming from fear emerge when cultures and societies
are forced to relate to each other and to design their own political rules. We have
become global subjects and our condition is to learn about other persons’ beliefs
and to compare our ways of life. These forms of communication produce a second
level of reflexivity towards our beliefs and other people’s beliefs. This second level
of reflexivity is what MacIntyre calls the “second first language” because reflexivity
is involved in learning a second language as if it was our first (MacIntyre, 1998, p.
374). When learning about others, our reactions of insecurity and fear are captured
by the image of a person climbing a mountain through a narrow path. When the
person looks at her surroundings, she faces the void and her reaction is a fear of
falling. This process is called “vertigo”. The use of this metaphor, illustrates that the
vertigo of secularization describes how the processes of reflexivity introduced by
modernity’s autonomous processes of founding political authority have forced us to
confront the challenge of our beliefs and others’ beliefs as co-existing, and as parts
of a wider political culture that we still need to construct. With modernity, we have
given ourselves notions that would allow us to live with others, to respect others,
and to tolerate other peoples’ beliefs. We have been forced to do so by assuming
that humans must set the norms of political life as an important sphere of social
construction. This awareness can make us fearful. To dispel the vertigos that we
might suffer, we have to create paths towards institutions that allow us to continue
climbing our way up to the hill. It is this process of the creation of social institutions,
in order to learn to live together, that I wish to focus as the political process of
building up a human conception of authority. Thus, either we face the challenge not
to fall into the void of fear, which is when violence happens, or we learn what we
need to develop in terms of rules if we wish to learn to live with others.
In what follows, I would like to develop the idea that religions have played an
important role in founding the political idea of authority. Religions can be seen as
traditions. Nowadays, it is impossible for them to survive as closed traditions. All
traditions have been subject to some kind of translations. The most interesting
issue here, however, is that, religions have contributed to the idea of political
authority but, contrary to what Carl Schmitt claims, not all political concepts were
simply derived from theological translations (Schmitt, 1994). Some religious
translations become true innovations. Thus, we must differentiate between these
kind of translations by the same semantic meaning (as those to which Carl Schmitt
refers), and those translations by linguistic and conceptual innovation which give
place to an authentic political innovation. I also wish to argue that it is because of
those innovative translations, which become socially successful, that we can justify
the autonomy of the political dimension of a modern concept of authority.
When societies are capable of understanding the need to create their own
rules, those vertigos of secularization can be exorcised. The difficult task of
creating a new political world based on its own kind of authority requires a special
type of creative process. It is a dialectic in which the disappearance of a lost world
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can only be recovered through innovation. These processes were not only an
exchange of worlds, but rather, as Blumenberg says, they were historical
processes immersed in a dialectic of “radical discontinuity of belonging”
(Blumenberg, 1991, p. 10). They offered us a knowledge of the “paradox” that we
can grasp in the modern age’s basic characteristic of “worldliness” only under
conditions that “precisely on account of this quality, [such a dimension] must be
inaccessible to us” (Blumenberg, 1991, p. 10). It is for this reason that this
interrelationship between religion and authority demands our attention, if only
because we need to understand why some efforts of translation were more
successful than others. Furthermore, some historical translations became
important innovations. When the processes of translation were successful, they
made a qualitative leap because they provided with a new political meaning, a
modern concept of authority, by disclosing an important unseen dimension of the
political world.
Weber described these processes of disenchantment as theoretical devices for
understanding how the locus of sacredness was removed from its roots and put, in
some way, into a different realm –that of the conscious tendency to rationalize our
beliefs. With the growing distancing “effect” of our rational attitude toward religion
between humans and the sacred, comes the necessity “of sustaining the ties
between them in a much more deliberate and critical manner” (Geertz, 1973, p.
174). Thus, our need to find the autonomy for the concept of authority. Religious
rationalization is, thus, not an all-or-none process. It is not necessarily irreversible
or inevitable, but, as Clifford Geertz has argued, “it is a real one” (1973, p. 175).
We must, therefore, look at the processes of secularization in the context of a
complex cultural understanding of traditions. If we are to believe that societies
already possess some sort of rationalized ways of coping with religion, then we
must try to understand that these processes have already provoked what Geertz
has described as the “shaking of the foundations of [a] social order” (1973, p. 173).
Thus, secularization should not be seen as a Western panacea, but rather as a
complex concept that best captures the metaphors of how societies seek to better
situate themselves when faced with the growing complexity of plural societies and
of their ways of rationalizing their beliefs2. According to Weber, secularization was
understood as the way in which societies accommodated their different realms of
action by creating specific spaces for the political, the legal, and the private
spheres3.
Redefining the Relations between Authority and Secularization
All great political thinkers have been conscious of the importance between religion
and politics. If we look back at the history of philosophy, we find that not only the
Greeks and Romans –whose traditions held that this relationship was one of the
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  “John L. Esposito, a scholar of religion at Georgetown University and author of a new book on Islam,
notes that Christianity and Judaism evolved gradually, and sometimes bloodily, over many centuries,
while in Islam the pressure is accelerated”  (Kristof, 2002).
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  See: Weber, 1958, and also Weber, 1964.
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most important problems concerning the identity of their communities– dealt openly
with these issues. Machiavelli, for example, was the first modern philosopher who
understood the vital connection between religion and politics. He clearly visualized
that the founding of a new religion was a task “due to men” and not “due to
heaven”. In other words, “ it is the subject to a kind of a first-order politics” (Beiner,
1993, p. 623). It is for this reason that Hannah Arendt thought Machiavelli best
understood the importance of foundations for a political order when he argued that
if “Moses was the founder of the Hebrew civilization; and Cyrus was the founder of
the Persian civilization; Romulus was the founder of the Roman civilization; and
Theseus the was the founder of the Greek civilization”, then “one would need to
found a new religion” (Beiner, 1993, p. 623). For Machiavelli, the reinterpretation of
Christianity by recovering the lost heritage of the Romans was the only possible
path toward political creation. Translation in this religious sense entailed a new
interpretation more consonant with the cultural demands of a neo-pagan politics.
Thus, he thought that “Christianity had to be paganized” (Beiner, 1993, p. 625).
Hobbes belongs to the same civil/religious tradition. He began by focusing on
how to use religion to promote the idea of political authority and, like Machiavelli,
he understood that in order to do so he needed to de-Christianize Christianity.
Instead of going back to paganism, as Machiavelli did, he decided to go back
further and delve deep into the Judaic tradition for important insights. He drew a
criticism of theocracy through a reading of the Old Testament. His conclusion was
that only a monarchy could confront possible anarchy deduced by the idea of
Hebrew prophets all claiming for some kind of authority. Hobbes thought that the
rule of priests generated anarchy and only kings could stabilize the political order.
Hobbes’s task was to save religion from interfering with the requirements of the
political order.
We recall Rousseau’s efforts to say something meaningful about civil religion in
The Social Contract. He captured, however, the particularistic tensions that all
religions possess. Rousseau was caught between the particularistic goals of a
closed community and those of the cosmopolitan brotherhood, which he so wished
to highlight the political community he envisioned.
These classical philosophers were the founders of a new tradition that we now
call “Civil Religion”. They wanted to configure a political theory in which this
interconnection between religion and politics was described as the essential source
for new meanings assigned to authority, legitimacy, and tradition. They wanted to
find crucial translations of religious concepts which would allow them to prolong the
relationship between humanity and the sacred. Their efforts to translate religious
authority into the idea of political authority was a means to recover the dimension
of “fear” attached to the idea of obedience. Thus, instead of coping with their
historical vertigos of secularization, they succumbed to them. I say that they
succumbed to their vertigos because they were trapped by their own paradoxical
exits. In order to avoid violence, they were compelled to draw on violence. The
paradox lay in their “attempt to become like God”. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes
wanted to transcend violence by “gathering all violence into a leader so fearsome
that order can be secured” (McGowan, 1997, p. 276). It is for this reason that
Hannah Arendt explained this failure as a new kind of paradox, for they wanted “a
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new absolute to replace the absolute of divine power [which] is insoluble because
power under the condition of human plurality can never amount to omnipotence,
and laws residing on human can never be absolute” (Arendt, 1965, p. 39).
Drawing a Concept of Authority from a Purely Secular Source
We find a different perspective in Weber’s account of the problem between religion
and secularization. The primary source of Weber’s sociological analysis of authority
can be found in his definition of the role of legitimacy in political action. Indeed, the
concept of “legitimacy” is a central one in his work Economy and Society. Here
Weber defines “legitimacy” as the belief in legality, which draws its source from the
legal-rational process of enacted law4. Though he states that legitimacy is based
on a “belief”, he does not fully develop how it is that in modern society law is
dissociated from internal motivation. Instead, he reduces his explanation to a
definition of legitimacy to a technical set of rules as means for ordering the
calculation of groups’ interest5. This problem has attracted the attention of scholars
specializing in Weber’s work on several fronts6. One important criticism focuses on
Weber’s idea of legitimacy as being a decisionistic feature7 of his sociological
analysis, for he gives no normative account connected to the internal motivations
for deciding why rational rules are better ways of coping with the idea of legitimate
authority8. This argument has been developed by Jürgen Habermas in his work
Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (1973). Habermas’s main argument is
that Weber was incapable of giving significance to the ideas of public debate and
deliberation -features that are important components of democratic legitimation.
Thus, Habermas’s main contribution to the critical debate lies in his claim that
legitimacy is not sufficient grounds to validate any authority. Rather, we need a
second level of validity: namely, that of a public process of how and why we
choose certain rules over others, a process that Habermas calls “legitimation”
(1973).
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 Weber defines that “the modern position of political associations rests on the prestige bestowed upon
them by the belief, held by their members, in a specific consecration: the «legitimacy» of that social
action which is ordered and regulated by them. This prestige is particularly powerful where, and in so far
as, social action comprises physical coercion, including the power to dispose over life and death. It is on
this prestige that the consensus on the specific legitimacy of action is founded” (Weber, 1978, pp. 903-
904).
5
 Peter Lassman argues that “the concept of «legitimacy» refers to the acceptance of the validity of the
order of rules”. This definition, however, “is not concerned with the normative question of whether or not
that body of rules ought to be considered legitimate, that is to say the question of the beliefs which
justify acceptance” (Lassman, 2000, p. 87).
6
 See: Beetham, 1991; Grafstein, 1981; Schaar, 1984; and Pitkin, 1972.
7
 Lassman argues that “legitimacy, for him, was to be regarded as a precarious political achievement
[…] Legitimacy is, in effect, defined in terms of legality” (Lassman, 2000, p. 88).
8
 Habermas argues that Weber reduces the belief on legitimacy to a belief on legality. This cannot, in
the long run, produce legitimation because a further condition needs to be met, namely, one must give
reasons for the legitimacy of the rules accepted or created. This would be the source of authority for the
moderns, according to Habermas. See Habermas, 1973.
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Weber’s view of authority resembles Hobbes’s theory of politics. Yet instead of
offering a connection to the religious dimension, which was central to Hobbes’s
idea of founding political authority, Weber ends up emptying the normative content
of the structure of political authority9. This is why he ends up bringing a secular
version of a Hobbesian view of the struggle for power.
Perhaps the best way to describe Weber’s idea of political authority is to say
that through the tensions that appear to be central in his thought, one is capable of
understanding some of the main tensions that lie at the heart of defining political
authority in the modern world. For example, Weber envisioned the modern
structure of politics as an autonomous sphere. He also clarified this autonomous
feature of modernity by distinguishing between social relationships and
associations which, for him, are based on similarities of interest and ideals, such as
those exemplified in a religious sect, and those relationships that are concerned
with ruling and being ruled. Nevertheless, tensions arise when we understand that
he believed political conflicts and problems will always be immersed in questions
that concern ultimate values. He could only conclude that those conflicts of value
are the consequences of disenchantment. Thus, Weber concluded that “the rule of
man over man” (Herrschaft) was an inescapable condition of a historical rupture.
He also believed that it was for this reason that the conflict over values makes our
modern world a disenchanted one.
The Innovative Vision of Authority
If we leave behind Weber’s sociological diagnosis of our modern “polytheism”10 and
turn now to the tradition of what I call “political innovation”, we must first focus on
Hannah Arendt’s work. She was conscious of the challenges posed by the vertigos
of secularization. In her essay entitled “Authority” (1968), Arendt was able to grasp
the complexities that surround our human efforts to dispel such vertigos. Her
reconstruction of modernity showed the modern incapacity to draw a concept of
“authority” (Arendt, 1968). We inherited one –originally taken from the Romans and
later transformed by the Christians– losing in this very same process what made
the connection between religion and politics an important dialectical liaison of
innovation and transformation.
The Romans thought of authority as a “new beginning”. The word “authority”,
Arendt reminds us, first appeared because it was derived from the word “augere”,
which means, “to augment”. For the Romans “what authority constantly augment[s]
is the foundation” (Arendt, 1968, p. 121). Arendt, however, claimed that “authority”
also meant allowing someone to become an “author”. The innovator of a translation
was the conceptual figure to whom Arendt referred. She saw an author as
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 Lassman argues that Weber thought of “modern mass democracies” as “plebiscitarian democracies in
which parties are involved in a continuous parliamentary struggle for power. Legitimacy resides simply
in the ability of a charismatic party leader to maintain the support of his followers and of the masses.
There is no attempt by Weber to appeal to any other standard of legitimacy” and, “this concentration on
relations of rule and the struggle for power as the central reality of politics reveals a tension in Weber’s
account” (Lassman, 2000, p. 95).
10
 By this expression he means the conflict over ultimate values as our legacy from religion.
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becoming a key figure in triggering the new process of laying foundations. With this
view, she already pointed out the artificiality of the creation of the sphere of politics.
She believes that the most important feature of the political is the conscious effort
of social construction -an effort that should allow us to build the political as
something created, something that does not belong to the realm of needs, but,
rather, to the realm of the public life, to freedom and action. To become the author
of a body politic is also to become a creative builder of a political community. Since
for the Romans the past played the most important role in laying foundations, they
took from their past all favorable examples to envision their new political goals.
When the Christian Church became Romanized, it “adapted itself so thoroughly
to Roman thinking in matters of politics that it made the death and resurrection of
Christ as the cornerstone of a new foundation, erecting on it a new human
institution of tremendous durability” (Arendt, 1968, p. 125). With this move, the
translation of meanings allowed the Church to change the Christian faith into a
religion. The Christians recorded the example of Christ and his followers as leading
to the cycles of life with the stages of birth, death, and resurrection. It was then that
the meaning of the Christian faith became a true religion, “not only in the post-
Christian sense but in the ancient sense as well”, and with that, the whole world
could “become Christian” (p. 126). What Arendt’s interpretation shows us is the
importance of a new beginning tied to one faith, for “those who had laid, as it were,
a curse on the whole realm of worldly public affairs and sworn to live in hiding -
discovered in their own faith something which could be understood as a worldly
event as well and could be transformed into a new mundane beginning to which
the world was bound back once more (religare) in a curious mixture of new and
religious awe” (p. 126).
What is most interesting is that Arendt realized “that the political had now, for
the first time since the Romans, lost its authority and with it that element which, at
least in Western history, had endowed political structures with durability, continuity,
and permanence” (p. 127). This happened through the fusion of the Roman legacy
with that of Plato’s political philosophy, which amalgamated itself with the Roman
political concept of authority, and with the Greek notion of transcendental
standards. This view reunited the particular and immanent causes as subsumed
into a political order. The moral rules for all interhuman behaviour, and the rational
measurements for the guidance of all individual judgment became one and the
same (p. 128). This very process, Arendt argues, led the West to provide us with a
failed concept of authority.
Plato’s philosophy, argues Arendt, offered the world of politics an
undifferentiated conceptual set of references, which blurred the distinctions
between ideas of the beautiful and the good, about immortality and the afterlife,
and about hell and bodily punishments. Moreover, Arendt argues, this was a
process in which religion was not translated into politics, rather politics into religion.
Plato used his myths as political targets. “One of the clearest indications for the
political character of these myths”, clarifies Arendt, is that “they imply bodily
punishment, [and] stand in flagrant contradiction to his doctrine of the mortality of
the body, and of this contradiction Plato himself was by no means unaware” (p.
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130). Plato was the first philosopher to use religious devices as political threats. He
coined the word “theology” and understood it not as the teaching and interpretation
of God’s words, but rather as “part and parcel of a «political science»”, a subject he
believed might be the leading guide for “the few” who need to rule “the many” (p.
131). Arendt argued that since Plato’s political theory played a part in his
philosophical thought, he regarded philosophical truth in politics as something that
could not be demonstrated. Thus, he thought belief was necessary. Plato also
believed that truth could not be the object of persuasion, but that he needed
persuasion in order to reach the multitude. It was then that he provided the idea
that only stories could become the appropriate vehicles to teach humans about
rewards and punishments after death. By “persuading the citizens of the existence
of hell”, quotes Arendt, we can make them “behave as though they knew the truth”
(p. 132).
When the Christian Church became interested in political power, the
complexities of Plato’s philosophy were reintroduced in a newer version. The
Platonic idea of hell, which had strengthened religious authority in the past,
remained victorious against secular power. Thus the legacy of the Roman notion of
authority was forever lost. This loss allowed an even more perplexing thing to
happen, since the only legacy that could be recovered was “an element of violence
[which] was permitted to insinuate itself into both the very structure of Western
religious thought and the hierarchy of the Church” (p. 133). Thus, Arendt’s
reconstruction shows us the problems associated with a historical vertigo of
secularization, which Modernity left unsolved. The conclusion of Arendt’s story
describes the defeat of the Roman legacy and the preservation of the violent
element that witnessed the crumbling relationship between religion, authority, and
tradition. With Marx, religion was finally declared to be “the opium of the people”,
and from then on only ideologies could replace religious views. Arendt’s conclusion
is that the vertigos of secularization produce the most horrendous reactions of
violence, precisely because we have lost our fear of hell. Consequently, religion
loses its political element, “just as public life was bound to lose the religious
sanction of transcendent authority” (p. 135).
Arendt became the real innovator when she searched for a way to establish the
concept of authority based on a positive view of power and accepted the conditions
of plurality. She replaced the act of founding that she so praised from the Romans
with a new act of linguistic founding. Political foundation became a performative
dialogue. The strength of her arguments is based on the way she transforms the
idea of authority. Instead of conceiving it as a relationship of command-obedience,
she saw it as the power of action and consent. Thus, she refused to identify power
with rule and law with command (p. 40). Authority is the positive view of power,
which “corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (p. 44).
Instead of allowing the ruler to become the “authority”, Arendt gives the authority to
“a group” –that is, authority becomes intersubjective. It “remains in existence only
as long as they remain together” (p. 44). Power is inextricably linked to action and it
is a product of the activities associated with creating a public world. Leaving behind
the dilemmas of the modern tradition, Arendt separates power and violence
because power can be described as the counterweight to violence (p. 51). The
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foundation of a political community is enacted by power as its “very condition”. By
“enabling the group of people to think and act in terms of the means-end category”
(p. 51), Arendt gives us the first decentered idea of authority and power. Both
freedom and rights become political creations; both are products of power. Instead
of visualizing rights as negative rights, the way liberals do, Arendt thinks of them as
ways in which power reflects on actions and as an important, concrete tools for
resisting violence.
Perhaps what makes Arendt a great political innovator is that she never loses
the sight of the dangers of the political life. Furthermore, because of her efforts at
dispelling the vertigos of secularization, she knew that contingencies could not be
avoided in the political order. She knew that we cannot lose sight of possible
outbursts of violence. The only way to avoid tyrannies, violence, or totalitarian
regimes is not to lose the sense that we are related to others and a consented
embodiment of a plurality, with many political and institutional settings especially
created for it. It is here that the performative side of her idea of authority originates.
She redefines the old idea of a social contract in a dynamic way: she sees the
“founding” as a “presumption of equality among all members of the polity”, who, as
members of the community, can endorse the linguistic act as it “establishes their
founding” (McGowan, 1997, p. 283).
As her work clearly demonstrates, Arendt provided the autonomy of the political
with her innovative concepts. The question, then, is: Has Arendt neglected religious
motives? Has she neglected traditional concepts and values that draw from
religious sources? The answer is no, she hasn’t. Yet she has used them creatively
to find with those translations a way toward real innovations. Take the religious
concept of the covenant, for example, as many social contract theorists did in the
past. When she presented the idea of a social contract, she managed to replace
the idea of obedience to the ruler that stemmed out of an idea of God and fear and,
instead, she used the ideas of promises and forgiveness (which, by the way, are
also taken from the Christian tradition). As McGowan has rightly observed, “her
contract is motivated not by the desire to attain security but by an attempt to enable
action” (1997, p. 283).
Arendt knew that action and freedom are the political conditions of the new era,
and her idea of a social contract is not meant to be used as a protection against
chaos or anarchy, but rather as ways in which public spaces become the
institutions of freedom and action. She redefined the already created ideal of the
social contract as a political device only when she described it as the expression of
what she called the “mutual promises” (Arendt, 1958, p. 244). “The sovereignty”,
argues Arendt, “lies in the inherent faculty of making and keeping promises” (p.
245).
Another of Arendt’s innovations comes from an interpretation of religion as she
used it with her idea of forgiveness to highlight our human frailty. We humans are
not gods. We make mistakes. We sometimes fail to keep our promises. We must
look at others as ourselves. We must learn to forgive. This is the most human of all
reactions.
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The two faculties belong together in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves
to undo the deeds of the past, whose “sins” hang like Damocles’ sword
over every new generation; and the other, binding oneself through
promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is
by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone
durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men.
(Arendt, 1958, p. 236)
 Thus, humans who value this nonviolent, political space can have the power to
keep it open “through their continuing acts of promising and forgiving” (McGowan,
1997, p. 285). She takes the idea of forgiveness from the Christian figure of Jesus.
What makes her use of such a figure a complete innovation is that she sees him as
teaching forgiveness because it is the most human of all our actions, “only through
this constant mutual release from what they can do can men remain free agents,
only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be
trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new” (Arendt, 1958, p.
240). Thus, our capacity to forgive ensures our freedom and our ability to stimulate
new actions.
As we have seen, Arendt draws from a variety of religious traditions.
Sometimes she is inspired by the Jewish tradition. She seeks the power of
storytelling as the great tales of the Bible helped the diasporic people not to perish
and to remain together. At other times, it is the Christian faith, with the examples of
Jesus, which enlighten us in our task of confronting our modern world. Christianity
is read in the tonality of our human fragility. At other times, she recovers from the
Roman ideals the figures of gods intermixing with humans: Janus, “the god of
beginning”, and Minerva, “the goddess of remembrance”. The two figures become
the symbols of the most precious features of her work. Weaving a tapestry from all
these traditions, Arendt is capable of finding ways to connect them all to our
political reality. By providing a new dimension of our political life, she creates those
same spaces that she describes. Thus, she makes the political world disclose the
new meanings needed for our lives. She transforms all our traditional
understandings of religions. This is what is implied in my concept of her
translations as innovation. She rooted the idea of authority as the most creative
recovery from the best contents of all religious views.
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